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Abstract
Jim Molyneaux and Ian Paisley, the then unionist leadership, began this process in 1987 when
they gave alternative proposals to Tom King, the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
The Brooke talks ended in apparent failure in November 1992, but from a unionist perspective,
in fact made significant progress. There was a period in 1993 when it appeared that the British
government was receptive to unionist urging to implement the “strand one committee report.”
Despite these doubts, we in the Ulster Unionist Party remained in the talks when Sinn Fein, the
political wing of the IRA, was admitted in September 1997. The last decade had also brought a
change in unionist attitudes. In the 1930s, there was a serious ”back to Westminster” movement
within the Ulster Unionist Party. They were content at that, even if they could only participate
vicariously in British politics. This reflects the unionist view that the relevant context is the British
Isles as a whole, which was an integrated political entity until partition in 1921. Although other
parties had played a part in the discussions, at the end it came down to the SDLP and the Ulster
Unionist Party. Moreover, we were well aware that any safeguards would be equally applicable to
defend unionist interests. Since then one Ulster Unionist Assembly member has defected to the
anti-Agreement unionists.
THE BELFAST AGREEMENT
David Trimble*
I. HISTORY OF THE BELFAST AGREEMENT
A. Beginnings
The Belfast Agreement' (or "Agreement") was made at
Stormont on the afternoon of April 10, 1998. For Ulster Union-
ists it was the culmination of an endeavor that stretched back
over a decade. Nearly fifteen years earlier on November 15,
1985, the British and Irish governments had entered into an-
other agreement.2 One of its principal architects, Geoffrey
Howe, the then British Foriegn Secretary, fondly believed that
he had solved "the Irish problem." His Prime Minister, Margaret
Thatcher, appeared to have the more modest aim of trying to
gain greater co-operation, primarily on security matters, from
the Irish government and northern nationalists, by making sig-
nificant concessions to nationalism in the governance of North-
ern Ireland.
The Anglo-Irish Agreement, however, was a failure even in
its more modest aims. It did not result in any reduction in the
level of terrorist violence. Indeed, it was counterproductive.
The Agreement was made without any consultation with union-
ists and was imposed on them, even though it was clear that it
was opposed by them and, indeed, opposed by a majority of the
people of Northern Ireland. Because it changed the way that
Northern Ireland was governed and did so in a way immune
from Parliamentary scrutiny, it seemed to many to be merely a
precursor of more fundamental constitutional changes. Conse-
quently, it radicalized many in the Protestant working classes, re-
sulting in increased loyalist paramilitary violence.
* First Minister [Designate] of the Northern Ireland Assembly; Leader of the
Ulster Unionist Party ("UUP"); Nobel Laureate for Peace, 1998.
1. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, Apr. 10, 1998 [hereinafter
Belfast Agreement].
2. Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Ireland, Nov. 15, 1985,
U.K.-Ir., Cmnd. 9657, reprinted in TOM HADDEN & KEVIN BOYLE, THE ANGLO-IRISH AGREE-
MENT 15-48 (1989).
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B. Brooke/Mayhew Talks
Mainstream unionism continued, as throughout the trou-
bles, to oppose the use of violence. Instead, it committed itself
to seek, by negotiation, an alternative to, and a replacement for,
the Anglo-Irish Agreement. Jim Molyneaux and Ian Paisley, the
then unionist leadership, began this process in 1987 when they
gave alternative proposals to Tom King, the then Secretary of
State for Northern Ireland. Negotiations did not, however, be-
gin until 1991 (sometimes known as the Brooke talks after Peter
Brooke, the then Secretary of State). These talks appeared to
end after a few months, but were resumed after the 1992 general
election, under the chairmanship of Patrick Mayhew, the new
Secretary of State. These talks were attended by the larger par-
ties committed to non-violence-often referred to as the consti-
tutional parties.
The Brooke talks ended in apparent failure in November
1992, but from a unionist perspective, in fact made significant
progress. A subcommittee in the talks had produced a report on
strand one matters (future administrative structures within
Northern Ireland) on which there was near agreement between
unionists and nationalists. It appeared to us that the major ob-
stacles were the failure of the two governments to resolve consti-
tutional differences and what appeared to unionists as the ambi-
tion of the Irish government, under the guise of cross-border co-
operation, to take over a substantial part of the internal govern-
ment of Northern Ireland.
C. The Territorial Claim
The constitutional differences stemmed from the territorial
claim in the Irish constitution, which claimed that Northern Ire-
land was, irrespective of the views of its inhabitants, part of the
national territory of the Republic of Ireland, or Eire, as the state
is formally titled in its constitution. At the time of the Anglo-
Irish Agreement, the British government had been persuaded
that this was merely an aspiration, which would be superseded by
a declaration in the agreement. The Irish Supreme Court, how-
ever, held that, notwithstanding the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the
relevant part of the Irish constitution, Articles 2 and 3, consti-
tuted a "claim of legal right" and that Ministers in the Irish Gov-
ernment were under a "constitutional imperative" to give effect
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to this claim. This decision curiously paralleled events in 1973-
1974 when a similarly flawed attempt at a solution (the Sun-
ningdale Agreement) was torpedoed by an Irish court ruling on
the constitutional claim.
D. The Downing Street Declaration
At the end of the Mayhew talks, the unionist leadership in-
vited the governments to resolve the constitutional differences
themselves and in the meantime urged the British government
to proceed to implement the "strand one committee report." In
the end, both aspects of this approach worked out otherwise
than intended.
There was a period in 1993 when it appeared that the Brit-
ish government was receptive to unionist urging to implement
the "strand one committee report." But in the autumn matters
changed. Then the prospect was held out, by the Hume/Adams
initiative, of an end to paramilitary violence if the paramilitary-
related political parties were given the opportunity of participat-
ing in the process. Consequently, the government appeared to
shift its priorities and the result was the Downing Street Declara-
tion of December 15, 1993.
The invitation to the governments to settle constitutional
differences eventually resulted in the so-called Frameworks doc-
ument of 1995. It was produced in quite different circumstances
than those at the time when unionists had invited the govern-
ment to produce proposals on constitutional matters. It did not
resolve properly the Irish territorial claim and contained propos-
als for extensive cross-border structures, which unionists saw as
undermining the Union. The Frameworks paper was obviously
unacceptable; worse, its existence poisoned relations between
unionists and the Major Government.
E. The Beginning of the Mitchell Talks
Unionists regarded this change in priorities with considera-
ble skepticism, for they doubted whether the paramilitaries gen-
uinely wanted to abandon terrorism. The IRA cease-fire in Au-
gust 1994 added to these doubts as republicans pointedly re-
fused to declare it permanent. Doubts as to the commitment of
paramilitaries to the principles of peace and democracy have not
yet been resolved, and the failure of the paramilitaries to build
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confidence in their intentions has been the major stumbling
block in the entire process since then.
Despite these doubts, we in the Ulster Unionist Party re-
mained in the talks when Sinn Fin, the political wing of the
IRA, was admitted in September 1997. Our reasons were first, to
ensure that unionism was not marginalized, and second, to try to
obtain an agreement with the Irish government and non-violent
northern nationalism, i.e., the SDLP, and, in the process, put
Irish Republicanism to the test. In all of these aims, I believe, we
succeeded. And in so doing we completed the 1991-1992 talks
process.
I. WHY SUCCESS NOW?
Why did we succeed in 1998 when previous attempts had
failed? There will no doubt be scope for many a doctoral theses
on this point, and I do not intend to try to identify all the rea-
sons, but there are some factors that can be identified.
This time there were different governments in power in
both the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. In the
case of the former, a government with a substantial overall ma-
jority replaced one that suffered from a gradually disappearing
wafer-thin majority. This did not have the significance that was
often assumed, for on Northern Ireland the Major Government
always had the support of Labour. But there was indubitably a
benefit in having a government at the beginning of its term with
a decisive leader rather than an indecisive administration at the
debilitated end of an eighteen year spell in office.
A. Blair
The difference made by a new British Government
presented itself to us primarily in terms of Tony Blair's policies.
Like other Northern Ireland parties, we believed that the legal
protection of human rights was an indispensable part of any
agreement. This would have to take at least the form of the in-
corporation into domestic law of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms'
("Convention" or "European Convention"). For various reasons,
3. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
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mainly because of their conception of English law, the Conserva-
tive Party was opposed to this. Labour was not. The change of
government removed this obstacle.
The previous Conservative Government was, in principle,
opposed to devolution to the constituent parts of the United
Kingdom. They were prepared to make an exception for North-
ern Ireland, but were hampered by their inability to give a prin-
cipled explanation for the inconsistency of their policies. They
were consequently opposed to the concept of a Council of the
British Isles, a key issue for unionists. As one Conservative Cabi-
net Minister said to me, this idea raised questions for the Con-
servatives, with regard to Scotland and Wales, that they were un-
able to answer. Again, the election of a Labour Government
with a commitment to devolution to Scotland and Wales solved
this problem and, indeed, made the subsequent Belfast Agree-
ment fit into a pattern of constitutional development through-
out the United Kingdom as a whole.
B. Ahern
While the new government in the Republic of Ireland was,
like its predecessor, a coalition, the dynamics within the coali-
tion were quite different. The personal authority of the
Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, was considerably greater, and it was al-
ways going to be easier for de Valera's constitution to be
changed by a Fianna Fail Government than against the opposi-
tion of that party.
C. Personal Factors
Of course, one cannot omit the purely personal factors.
The personal commitment to the talks of both Tony Blair and
Bertie Ahern was vital. Nowhere was this more clearly shown
than in the final week of the talks when the British Prime Minis-
ter relocated himself in Belfast and personally conducted the fi-
nal negotiating sessions, and when, that Wednesday, the Irish
Taoiseach came straight to Belfast from the funeral of his
mother. Also vital for the success of the talks was the chairman-
ship of Sen. George Mitchell; his scrupulous fairness and infinite
patience won the confidence of all.
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D. Changes in Europe
There were also some long-term factors at work. Attitudes
in Western Europe to nationality have changed in the course of
the last fifty years. The defeat of Nazism, the reconstruction of
West Germany within NATO as a modern liberal society, the
greater ease and availability of travel both for business and lei-
sure, and the development of the European Community all pro-
duced a sense of integration and a more relaxed attitude to na-
tional differences. In the past, nationalists generally put an em-
phasis on a national territory and on cultural homogeneity
within that territory. These values now came to appear old-fash-
ioned. The impact of this change was particularly marked on
the Irish Republic, which, until its accession to the European
Community in 1973, had been outside the mainstream of Euro-
pean experience this century.
At the same time the concept of self-determination was be-
coming less territorial and was moving to a focus on individual
and group rights. This can be seen in the stress on human rights
in the Helsinki Accords (1975), which developed from the indi-
vidual to the communal through the "human dimension" of sub-
sequent accords, culminating in the Charter of Paris (1992).
Through the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Eu-
rope there has been an attempt to apply these principles to a
number of national and ethnic conflicts in the last decade.
E. John Hume
These changes in thought were reflected in the work of
John Hume, who for many years has worked to redefine Irish
nationalism. He has tried to move Irish nationalism away from
the simplistic territorial certainties enshrined in de Valera's con-
stitution and instead attempted to concentrate it on people
rather than land and on seeking agreement between the people
who actually inhabit the land in question. By implication, this
approach involves the concept of consent, which unionists have
regarded as the core of their position and which was to underpin
the Belfast Agreement. By this redefinition of nationalism, a
common ground, where dialogue might take place, became pos-
sible.
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F. Collapse of Communism
The end of the cold war and of the division of Europe fur-
ther reinforced the feeling of many in Northern Ireland that this
dispute was simply out of place in modern Europe. The fall of
Communism was also significant as Eastern Europe was, indi-
rectly, a major source of munitions for the Republican move-
ment, and both they and some loyalists styled themselves as "so-
cialist" and drew inspiration from revolutionary mythology and
Leninist methodology.
G. Unionist Changes
The last decade had also brought a change in unionist atti-
tudes. Unionism had acquiesced in the abolition of the de-
volved Parliament at Stormont in 1972. For most unionists,
Stormont had not been of great value in itself. Historically,
unionists preferred the situation before the creation- of a de-
volved Parliament for Northern Ireland when they were fully in-
tegrated into the United Kingdom. The acceptance of Stormont
in 1920 as a "historic compromise," to quote SirJames Craig, was
no mere form of words. In the 1930s, there was a serious "back
to Westminster" movement within the Ulster Unionist Party.
Consequently, when in the mid-1970s, it became clear that the
abolition of Stormont was not going to be followed by moves
towards a united Ireland, most unionists regarded direct rule as
tolerable. Direct rule did, however, have disadvantages, the
chief one being what we called the democratic deficit. This
arose because local services were being centralized at the re-
gional level just as Stormont was abolished. As a result, there
existed in Northern Ireland only district councils with very lim-
ited functions, and what in any normal society would be re-
garded as matters for a local administration were handled by
London-based Ministers who were not accountable to the local
electorate.
Unionists, in fact, were more concerned with preventing na-
tionalists exercising power over them than they were with exer-
cising power themselves. They were content at that, even if they
could only participate vicariously in British politics. While a re-
turn to Stormont was desirable in theory, it was not then consid-
ered worth the compromise entailed in an accommodation with
nationalists.
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This changed after 1985. The imposition of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement, involving what unionists regarded as a form of Dub-
lin rule, led many unionists to reassess direct rule. It no longer
seemed so benign or tolerable, and the desire to restore a mea-
sure of local control over local decisions became stronger, even
if acquiring such control could only be achieved at the price of a
compromise with northern nationalism. It was this desire that
brought unionists to make overtures about talks to the govern-
ment in 1987, which in unionist eyes was the beginning of the
road that led to the Agreement made at Stormont on April 10,
1998.
The talks in 1991 and 1992 left a number of unionists with
the conviction that an agreement with constitutional nationalism
was possible. Those talks had also defined the issues on the
three main constitutional and institutional areas, namely the
constitutional status of Northern Ireland, internal structures of
government in Northern Ireland, and relationships with the Re-
public of Ireland.
III. THE BELFAST AGREEMENT
A. Constitutional Issues
The Belfast Agreement dealt with constitutional issues
unambiguously, thus avoiding a repetition of the mistake made
in the Sunningdale Agreement in 1973 and the Anglo-Irish
Agreement in 1985. Those agreements made the mistake of
thinking that a declaration of the consent principle in a treaty
would be sufficient. But, of course, such a declaration was not
enough to override the clear statement in Article 2 of the 1937
Irish Constitution that "the national territory was the whole is-
land of Ireland . . . ." This time the Belfast Agreement provides
for the repeal in their entirety of Articles 2 and 3. In their place
is a new Article 2, which recognizes the right of persons on the
island of Ireland to be part of the Irish nation if they so wish.
A new Article 3 sets out the aspiration of a united Ireland.
It recognizes, however, that this could be "brought about only by
peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people,
democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions .... ." The latter
phrases interestingly contain a double referendum, i.e., that
even if the people of Northern Ireland voted for a united Ire-
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land, there would also have to be a referendum in the Republic
of Ireland.
The first paragraph of the Agreement clearly recognizes
that it is for the people of Northern Ireland alone, without any
outside interference, to determine the destiny of Northern Ire-
land.4 This conclusion is firmly stated in subparagraph (ii) with
its reference to the exercise of consent being "without external
impediment."5 Subparagraph (i) contains a recognition of the
"legitimacy of whatever choice is freely exercised by a majority of
the people of Northern Ireland."6 This subparagraph is rein-
forced by the explicit acknowledgement in subparagraph (iii)
that the present wish of the people of Northern Ireland for the
maintenance of the United Kingdom is "freely exercised and le-
gitimate . . .,,
During the negotiations, the Irish government regularly re-
ferred to the need for a balanced constitutional settlement. As a
result, the Agreement provides for clauses, which were incorpo-
rated into the Northern Ireland Act 1998, incorporating the con-
sent principle and undertaking to support the wishes of the peo-
ple of Northern Ireland if they wished to become part of a
united Ireland. This provision, however, is merely a restatement
of existing British legal provisions stemming back to the Irish
Free State (Agreement) Act 1921.
The Agreement also addresses the need for protection of
human rights and equality in civil, political, social, and cultural
rights. This will be secured primarily by the incorporation of the
European Convention into U.K. law. With regard to the re-
gional administration in Northern Ireland, it will not be able to
legislate or act contrary to the Convention. Under this conven-
tion, any aggrieved citizen will have a remedy in the courts. In
addition, there will be a Human Rights Commission and an
Equality Commission to keep those matters under review. The
Republic of Ireland undertook to establish a Human Rights
Commission, to ratify the Council of Europe Framework Con-
vention on National Minorities (already ratified by the United
Kingdom), and to consider the incorporation of the European
4. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Constitutional Issues 1.
5. Id. 1(ii).
6. Id. I(i).
7. Id. 1 (iii) (emphasis added).
1999] 1153
1154 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1145
Convention into its law. All these mafters were not controversial
in the talks themselves, Unionists having been committed to the
concept of a judicially enforceable Bill of Rights since the early
1970s.
The draft report presented by Senator Mitchell's team in
the final week of the negotiations contained the above constitu-
tional provisions. While it was acceptable to us on those points,
the constitutional implications of its proposals on north/south
matters were so far-reaching that we had no alternative but to
reject the draft in its entirety.
B. North/south Matters
Following our rejection of the Mitchell draft, Prime Minis-
ter Blair and Taoiseach Ahern decided to come to Belfast. With
them we decided to concentrate on north/south matters. Our
concern was to ensure that the proposed North/South Ministe-
rial Council would, unlike the 1973 proposed Council of Ire-
land, have no supra-national characteristics. Instead, for us, it
was essential that it should clearly draw its authority from the
Northern Ireland Assembly and the Irish Dil and be accounta-
ble to these democratic institutions.
Our impression was that this was not, in principle, unaccept-
able to the Irish Government. But their concern was that if they
conceded a veto for the Northern Ireland Assembly, which
would, because of the requirement for unanimous decisions, be
in practice a unionist veto, then the North/South Ministerial
Council might be completely stultified. They wanted to be sure
that there would in fact be more than lip-service to north-south
co-operation. This came down to a matter of trust. The Irish
delegation wanted the Agreement to contain a number of pre-
cooked co-operation schemes. The draft contained a list of such
schemes, but its length was such that Senator Mitchell in his
memoirs on the talks said that he immediately concluded that it
would be impossible for us to accept the proposals. We consid-
ered that we could not commit the Assembly, even before it was
elected. Moreover, having being excluded from participation in
the administration of Northern Ireland for twenty-six years, we
were not in a position to judge the merits of any of the proposed
schemes. Above all, putting pre-cooked schemes in the agree-
BELFAST A GREEMENT
ment smacked of imposition, and after the 1985 Agreement the
notion of any imposition was anathema to unionists.
The solution emerged late on the Wednesday and was based
on our suggestion for an imaginative use of the transitional pe-
riod. I was aware from discussions with the Northern Ireland
Office that while the intention was to proceed as quickly as possi-
ble to Assembly elections-they were held on June 25, 1998-it
would not be possible to transfer power until February 1999 at
the earliest. Consequently, we suggested that the Assembly use
this transitional period to consider and agree upon a number of
cross-border co-operation schemes. This met our concerns and
at the same time gave the Irish the assurance that there would be
some cross-border co-operation. It also tied in with the concept
that all the institutions of the Agreement should come into oper-
ation at the same time. As Paddy Teahon, the Irish Cabinet Sec-
retary, said, the transitional period could be likened to someone
threading pearls onto a string. The individual pearls would be
the various individual aspects of the Agreement, to which each
north/south co-operation scheme could be added, one by one,
as agreed during the transitional period, so that at the end of the
transition all the institutional aspects of the Agreement would
come up together.
As additional assurance, the Agreement set a target date of
October 31 for agreement on these schemes. Ultimately, the tar-
get was not achieved. This was due to a range of factors, as can
be seen from the fact that the Irish Government did not submit
its suggestions in writing to the parties in the Northern Ireland
Assembly until October 30. Agreement appeared to be reached
at the beginning of December, but for various reasons it then
unraveled. It was not until December 1.8, 1998 that agreement
was reached on six co-operation schemes that would involve the
creation of new cross-border machinery. That agreement was
translated into legal effect by March 10, 1999, when four new
British-Irish treaties were made and legislation to give the appro-
priate capacity to that new machinery was enacted.
Our concerns about the status and accountability of the
North/South Ministerial Council are met in the Agreement.
The North/South Ministerial Council is not a supra-national
body. The Ministers from Dublin and Belfast who meet in it
must act "in accordance with the rules for democratic authority
and accountability in force in the Northern Ireland Assembly
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and the Oireachtas respectively."8 This is reinforced by para-
graph 6, which reads,
Each side to be in a position to take decisions ... within the
defined authority of those attending, through the arrange-
ments in place for co-ordination of executive functioned with
each jurisdiction. Each side to remain accountable to the As-
sembly and Oireachtas respectively, whose approval ... would
be required for decisions beyond the defined authority of
those attending.
9
It should be noted that "defined authority" in this paragraph
means the authority given by the Executive or Assembly with re-
gard to a particular meeting of the North/South Ministerial
Council. Also, in the North/South Ministerial Council the
Northern Ireland delegation must be balanced as between
unionist and nationalist,10 and that delegation acts as a unit.
This gives unionists the assurance that nothing will happen in
this North/South Ministerial Council without their consent.
C. British-Irish Council
The North/South Ministerial Council is balanced by the
creation of a British-Irish Council. This reflects the unionist view
that the relevant context is the British Isles as a whole, which was
an integrated political entity until partition in 1921. That inte-
gration has never entirely disappeared. The United Kingdom
and the Republic of Ireland form a common travel area. Citi-
zens of either state acquire most of the rights of citizenship in
the other on residence, without having to become naturalized,
and, most importantly, there continues to be a high degree of
economic, social, and cultural interaction. In terms of both
travel and trade, the east/west axis is more important than the
north/south one.
The British-Irish Council also responds to the development
of devolution within the United Kingdom. It will consist of the
British and Irish Governments and the regional administrations
within the British Isles, namely the Isle of Man and the Channel
Isles .(both of which are strictly speaking outside the United
8. Id., Strand Two, North/South Ministerial Council 1 2.
9. Id. 6.
10. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Relations with
other institutions 1 30.
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Kingdom) and, on their creation, the devolved administrations
in Northern Ireland, Scotland, and Wales. At the time of the
Agreement, there were no regional administrations within the
Republic of Ireland and so the issue did not then arise. Since
then a measure of regionalization has been mooted, and the
British-Irish Council, when it meets, may have to reconsider the
matter.
Like the North/South Ministerial Council, the British-Irish
Council will operate by consensus and be a forum where the par-
ties can discuss, consult, and agree on co-operation on matters
of mutual interest. Such co-operation may result in common
policies or common action. Such co-operation could be on a
bilateral or multilateral basis and could involve mechanisms to
enable consultation, co-operation, and joint decision-making
and mechanisms to implement any joint decisions made. Conse-
quently, the British-Irish Council could develop the same type of
implementation body already being created within the north/
south context. While it has not yet attracted a high level of pub-
lic visibility, it could be that this will, in the long-term, be the
most important for the future. Certainly, it must be significant
that for the first time since 1921, the Republic of Ireland has
come into an institutional relationship with all other parts of the
British Isles.
D. The Northern Ireland Assembly
Having settled the arrangements for north/south co-opera-
tion, the question of the administration of Northern Ireland was
left for Thursday evening, which had been planned as the last
night of the negotiations. Although other parties had played a
part in the discussions, at the end it came down to the SDLP and
the Ulster Unionist Party. For both of us it was familiar ground.
The concept of an assembly elected by proportional representa-
tion with powers similar to the old Stormont Parliament, but
with an initial reservation of police powers was common ground.
However, that left to be decided the all-important issue of the
way in which those powers would be exercised and the extent of
safeguards to avoid abuse of power and to protect minorities, as
it was agreed that such safeguards should exist.
The original unionist proposals had been for an administra-
tion operating in a way similar to local government, that is, a
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system of executive committees, without Ministers, as such.
Unionists proposed that such committees be formed on a pro-
portional basis, with the chairmanships distributed proportion-
ally among the parties. This, we argued, would allow all parties
to be involved at all levels and in all stages of the process. Pro-
portionality was to be achieved by the application of the
d'Hondt formula, as used in the European Parliament. This en-
abled parties, in turn, to make choices about which position they
would hold-the order in which choices would be made to be
determined by the size of their representation in the Assembly.11
The unionist proposals were deliberately designed to be inclu-
sive, and it is worth noting that the basic concept was contained
in the paper presented by Ian Paisley and Jim Molyneaux to Sec-
retary of State Tom King in 1987.
During the negotiations, the unionist proposals were subject
to criticism, particularly by the SDLP, on the grounds that they
would be too unwieldy and inefficient in practice. Conse-
quently, Unionists modified the scheme. They proposed that
each committee would have, in addition, a Secretary to carry out
committee decisions. However, the SDLP held out for a conven-
tional Executive or cabinet system with Ministers.
In the negotiations, the SDLP also proposed a very elabo-
rate range of checks and balances. We understood the need for
safeguards. Indeed, the talks procedures with their requirement
for a majority of unionists and a majority of nationalists to en-
dorse any decision set a clear precedent, which, in effect, was
followed. Moreover, we were well aware that any safeguards
would be equally applicable to defend unionist interests. We
were very concerned, however, that the safeguards proposed by
the SDLP, in particular an elaborate system of special committee
hearings for key proposals and decisions, were so overworked
that they would prevent effective government. The SDLP re-
sponded to this criticism by suggesting that this safeguard could
be overridden, by a cross-community vote. Moreover, they sug-
gested an alternative method for achieving a cross-community
vote to that used in the talks. In addition to the majority of
unionists and a majority of nationalist as in the talks, it was sug-
11. For a further explanation of the d'Hondt system, see Brendan O'Leary, The
Nature of the Agreement, 22 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 1628, 1663 app.2 (1999).
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gested that a sixty percent weighted majority would suffice, pro-
vided that it included forty percent of each communal identity.
While both ourselves and the SDLP had already offered an
element of compromise during the negotiations, if there was go-
ing to be an Agreement, there had to be further compromises.
It would perhaps have been desirable for us to have pressed the
SDLP further, but there was the danger that if we did, we would
leave them open to attack by Sinn F~in. The SDLP had to be
able to say that they had obtained safeguards that would protect
the essential interests of nationalists. This meant that on a range
of issues the -SDLP Would in effect have a veto. In theory, this
was undesirable, for it could result in stalemate, but we knew
that the realities of society in Northern Ireland meant that no
arrangements would work unless built on moderate nationalism
and moderate unionism. Several times in the negotiations with
the SDLP, I described our two parties as the center of gravity of
Northern Ireland. If we were determined to work together, then
virtually any system could be made to work, and so it has proved
since the Agreement in the relationship between myself and the
Deputy First Minister, Seamus Mallon.
We therefore decided to move closer to an executive-based
administration and even to adopt the terminology of "Ministers,"
which we knew to be close to the SDLP's heart, and to adopt the
SDLP safeguard scheme as they had amended it. What strongly
influenced the latter decision was that the SDLP scheme for safe-
guards limited cross-community votes to a handful of circum-
stances, with a trigger mechanism that such a vote would be re-
quired for other matters if a "petition of concern" is presented
by thirty members of the Assembly.12 This decision, taken after
midnight on Thursday, effectively ended the strand one negotia-
tions when it was reported to the Chairman's office.
12. In the Agreement, cross-community votes are only required on the election of
the Chair of the Assembly, the First and Deputy First Minister, adoption of Standing
Orders and Budget allocations, decisions to invoke the equality procedures, and exclu-
sion or removal from Office. The draftsman of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, how-
ever, added significantly to the list, in most cases without consulting the parties. I
formed the impression that whenever he or she encountered a difficult drafting deci-
sion, resort was had to a cross-community vote or a joint decision for First and Deputy
First Minister-the Agreement is also very economical on the latter.
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E. Other Matters
There were, in addition to the constitutional and institu-
tional matters mentioned above, a range of other matters that
were also crucial to the Agreement. These covered the so-called
equality agenda, policing, security, decommissioning, and pris-
oners.
1. Human Rights
Reference has been made above to the decision to incorpo-
rate the European Convention into domestic law. This will pro-
duce a legal revolution. In the absence of a formal constitution,
U.K. courts and lawyers are not accustomed to working with fun-
damental laws. In British constitutional law, Parliament can, in
theory, enact whatever it wills, and judges cannot strike down
statutes or administrative acts based on statutes as unconstitu-
tional. This will now change, if only for the devolved regions.
The European Convention is incorporated into U.K. law gener-
ally in a very cautious manner. A decision by the courts that a
statute contravenes the Convention does not invalidate the stat-
ute, but leads to a special Parliamentary procedure by which Par-
liament, if it wishes, may amend the statute. In the devolved re-
gions, however, the Convention is made fundamental law for the
devolved legislature and administration.
Courts, lawyers, legislators, and administrators in Northern
Ireland, Scotland, and Wales will, therefore, have to develop a
range of new skills and to cope with new legal challenges in a
way in which their counterparts in England will not. It will be
interesting to see how quickly these skills develop. In the Irish
Republic it took about a generation for the fundamental law
adopted in the 1937 constitution to develop a substantial body of
case law. Also interesting will be the reaction of the Appellate
Committee of the House of Lords, as most of its members will
continue to be drawn from England.
There is here a precedent that I hope will not be followed.
The Government of Ireland Act 1920 contained a few sections
that operated as fundamental law for the Northern Ireland Par-
liament.13 There was very little litigation based on them. In the
13. The failure to use these provisions is quite remarkable as they rendered uncon-
stitutional and invalid statutes and, arguably, administrative actions that were discrimi-
natory in religious terms. In the half century of the Stormont Parliament, there was
only one case brought alleging that an Act of Parliament discriminated in religious
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late 1940s, however, the Northern Ireland Court of Appeal, bas-
ing its decision on a major U.S. Supreme Court decision, tried to
create a situation where a wide range of administrative acts
would become subject to judicial control. The House of Lords,
however, stepped back from this judicial adventurism and con-
strued the 1920 Act so as to return the Courts to the traditional
British approach.
The incorporation of the European Convention is rein-
forced by a statutory obligation to promote equality of opportu-
nity, a Human Rights Commission, and an Equality Commission.
The task of the Human Rights-Commission will be to review the
adequacy and effectiveness of existing laws and practices and to
make recommendations thereon, the latter to advise on, vali-
date, and monitor the operation of the statutory equality obliga-
tion. There is an interesting comparison here. The incorpora-
tion of the European Convention as fundamental law for the As-
sembly is, in British terms, a radical step. Establishing a
commission of persons with much experience of politics or ad-
ministration who are each considered to be a "safe pair of
hands" to advise' government is the traditional British practice.
Time will tell which will prove the more effective. I rather sus-
pect that the old-fashioned approach will be eclipsed by the
more radical approach.
It should be noted that the Equality Commission is not a
new measure. Apart from its work on the statutory equality obli-
gation, it will merely continue the work of the Fair Employment
Commission, the Equal Opportunities Commission, the Com-
mission for Racial Equality, and the Disability Council. Indeed,
it appears to have been the policy of the British Government to
merge these commissions anyway, and the Agreement and subse-
quent legislation was utilized as a handy vehicle. Similarly, the
reference later in the Agreement to a new regional development
strategy and a new economic development strategy are not, in
fact, Agreement-inspired proposals, but part of the administra-
tion's routine review of its policies.
terms. The case, which was brought by a Protestant clergyman arguing that an Act
discriminated in favor of Roman Catholics, succeeded!
In addition, however, my academic and political colleague, Edgar Graham, who
was murdered by the IRA, argued persuasively that all the educational legislation passed
after World War II was unconstitutional as it endowed religion, both Protestant and
Catholic.
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2. Policing and Justice Matters
In dealing with policing and justice matters, it was agreed to
institute two major reviews. The first involved the establishment
of an independent Commission into policing arrangements with
international and expert representation among its membership.
The Commission has since been established under the chair-
manship of the former governor of Hong Kong and Northern
Ireland Office minister during some of the Thatcher years, Chris
Patten. The second review involves the criminal justice system
other than policing and matters relating to emergency legisla-
tion. A Civil Service team with some independent participation,
however, is carrying out the latter review. The Agreement sets
out the terms of reference of both reviews in full and generally
unexceptional terms.
The contents of the reviews when complete will, of course,
be extremely important, as policing and related matters can be
extremely controversial. It is partly for this reason that the re-
views were instituted. Had these matters been left to the talks
participants, the likelihood is that political considerations would
have dominated the outcome, assuming that is that there would
have been an outcome. Many doubted the ability of the talks
participants to agree these matters, even if they could agree, as
they did, on constitutional matters!
The criminal law review may also give rise to controversy as
it might provide a vehicle for what some call "restorative justice."
In some contexts this idea may be a quite innocent means of
enabling offenders to make some restitution to victims and the
community. However, in the actual circumstances that prevail in
Northern Ireland today, there is a serious danger that this con-
cept would degenerate into state support for paramilitary beat-
ings. These have increased significantly since the Agreement, as
paramilitaries try to keep control over working-class areas and to
maintain their rackets. Clearly, it would be unacceptable right
across the community for these to continue under the label of
"restorative justice." This problem could emerge too in connec-
tion with reforms of procedures concerning juveniles.
Two other problems might arise in connection with the re-
view of criminal law. The first relates to whether this matter,
together with responsibility for policing and prisons, should be
devolved to the Assembly. Under the 1998 Northern Ireland
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Act, this matter is initially reserved to the Westminster Parlia-
ment, and so the Secretary of State will continue to be responsi-
ble for it. There is, however, a broad view in Northern Ireland
that the Assembly should, as confidence is built in the new insti-
tutions, assume responsibility for criminal law, policing, and pris-
ons. It would be a mark of the growing maturity of the Assembly
and of the political parties in it to become the means by which
these services become accountable to society in Northern Ire-
land.
The second presents itself in the question of the decision to
prosecute. At the moment serious cases go to one of the princi-
pal law officers of the Crown, the Director of Public Prosecu-
tions, and in minor cases the decision to prosecute lies with the
police themselves. Recently, in England a Crown Prosecution
Service ("CPS") was created to put all these decisions into the
hands of professional lawyers, but the CPS has not been a suc-
cess, partly because of administrative problems, but partly, too,
because of the difficulty of attracting lawyers of sufficient caliber.
If, however, this matter is handled, as I would suggest, then
it could go a long way to deal with the difficult matter of confi-
dence in policing generally. Hitherto the question of confi-
dence in the police has been tackled by establishing codes of
conduct, complaints procedures, and a police ombudsman. But
these approaches are reactive; they come after the event. Police
and community liaison committees are proactive, but they look
at policy, and there the range for influence is necessarily limited
because of the need to protect the operational independence of
the police. If we were to adopt a more inquisitorial criminal pro-
cess, then this matter would be quite different. If we created a
legal post similar to the French Juge d'Instruction or the Scots
Procurator Fiscal, then we would be injecting an independent
element, notjust into the decision to prosecute but also into the
conduct of police investigations. This could obviate the increas-
ingly elaborate complaint procedures, which absorb so much of-
ficial and private time, effort, and money without, in many cases,
actually improving the situation.
3. Early Release of Prisoners
The bulk of the Agreement relates to new institutions and
to major constitutional and other legal changes, which are
1999] 1163
1164 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 22:1145
clearly intended to last for some considerable time. The final
two matters to mention, in contrast, are intended to be short-
term matters to be dealt with over a two-year period. Yet, these
short-term matters-prisoners and decommissioning-have
proved so controversial that they have threatened the accept-
ance and implementation of the Agreement.
It was generally accepted that in the event of an agreement
something would be done for prisoners. This was even accepted
by Ian Paisley, who, during the Brooke talks, wrote to a loyalist
prisoner, who was regarded as a go-between to the loyalist lead-
ership in prison, saying "if we do manage to achieve an alterna-
tive to the Anglo-Irish Agreement and a democratic government
is set up in Northern Ireland, matters in relation to prisoners
would have to be looked at very closely indeed with all the vari-
ous considerations being weighed in the balance."14
There is an interesting paradox concerning paramilitary
prisoners. In previous emergencies-the 1920 Troubles, World
War II, and the border campaign in the 1950s-the administra-
tion had resorted to internment without trial because of the dif-
ficulties of obtaining convictions under normal judicial proce-
dures. This practice was much criticized, but when the emer-
gency was ending those interned were simply released.15 In the
current emergency, when criticism of internment led to a reli-
ance on the criminal process, the release option was not easily
available. Prisoners were convicted of specific offenses. These
offenses, while they may have been politically motivated, were
not political offenses. They involved breaches of the normal
criminal law, such as murder, assault, and robbery. Conse-
quently, releases, in addition to causing distress to persons who
had suffered terrorist acts, were a direct political interference
with the operation of the criminal process and raised questions
14. Letter from Ian Paisley (May 22, 1991). The recipient's name is erased in the
published letter. On May 11, 1998, Billy McCaughey, who had served 16 years in prison
for a murder committed in 1977, gave an interview to the Irish News. In the interview,
he claimed that he had acted as liason with the paramilitaries and stated, "I had reassur-
ance from Paisley and Robinson that if the Talks reached a successful conclusion, then
the issue of prisoners would have to be looked at. Even in 1991 the DUP was prepared
to accept that the prison issue had to be resolved."
15. Internees were able to secure their release at any time during the emergencies
by giving an undertaking to keep the peace and not to engage in any acts of violence.
The government was prepared to accept the word of republican internees, but very few
availed themselves of this means of obtaining their liberty.
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about discrimination against other offenders, colloquially known
as "ordinary decent criminals."
Internment was not the only legal response in the previous
emergencies. Criminal proceedings had been brought in a few
cases. At the end of the so-called border campaign in 1962,
there were some republican prisoners serving determinate terms
for criminal offenses connected with that campaign. These sen-
tenced prisoners were released early over the ensuing eighteen
months, perhaps because it appeared unfair to continue their
imprisonment while their comrades were quietly released. The
talks participants were awareof the precedent, which reinforced
the expectation that early releases would occur.
The Agreement provided that each government "will put in
place mechanisms to provide for an accelerated programme for
the release of prisoners." These terms were used because of the
difference between the two states. Because of the legal regime
in the United Kingdom for prisoners, an early release scheme
required primary legislation. In the Irish Republic, however, all
releases are a matter for government discretion, so no specific
statutory scheme was necessary.
The United Kingdom scheme is given effect by the North-
ern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998. Normally, prisoners are enti-
tled to the remission of a portion of their sentences unless they
misbehave in prison, when they can suffer a "loss of remission."
The length of remission in Northern Ireland has varied from
time to time. In England, remission had been an automatic one-
third reduction of sentence, but in 1992 it was increased to one-
half. That increase was extended to Northern Ireland in 1995.
In effect, the 1998 Northern Ireland Act increases remission for
qualifying prisoners to two-thirds and applies that increase to the
period that a life sentence prisoner is considered by the Com-
mission to have been likely to spend in prison.
The Act also contains a number of safeguards. First, prison-
ers adhering to groups that are not maintaining a complete and
unequivocal cease-fire are excluded. Second, the Sentence Re-
view Commissioners must be satisfied that the individual pro-
posed for release is not likely to become involved in further acts
of terrorism. Third, prisoners released may be recalled to serve
the unexpired residue of their sentence if they become adher-
ents of organizations' not on cease-fire or if they become in-
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volved in terrorist acts. Finally, the government can suspend the
entire scheme if circumstances generally change.
Lastly, the Act provides for the release of any qualifying pris-
oners who are still in custody on the second anniversary of the
beginning of the early release scheme.
4. The Last Afternoon
Not all the above safeguards appear in the Agreement, but
the last provision does. It came as an unpleasant surprise when,
at midday on Good Friday, April 10, 1998, we saw the final draft
of the Agreement. We now understand thatthiS was inserted by
the two governments in the small hours of Friday morning, when
Sinn Fain, disappointed with the other parts of the Agreement
threatened to walk out.
When we examined the final draft, we had a number of con-
cerns, but after discussion they came down to two, prisoner re-
leases and decommissioning. As a response to those concerns,
the government showed us a draft of the release scheme. The
safeguards noted above were some consolation, and, although
still very unhappy with the scheme, we concluded, in the knowl-
edge that this was something that governments were always likely
to do, that we could not justify treating this as a break point. 6
5. Decommissioning
The other major concern was more difficult. The decom-
missioning of illegal weapons had been an important issue right
from the Downing Street Declaration in 1993. Important in it-
self, it was even more important as a test of whether the
paramilitaries were committed to peaceful means. If they were
so committed, then paramilitaries would have welcomed decom-
missioning as a means of putting weapons out of reach of dissi-
dents or Mafia-type elements. On the other hand, any refusal by
paramilitaries to decommission implied that they were not com-
mitted to exclusively peaceful means.
In over four years after the Declaration, the public stance of
republicans had been consistently negative.' 7 The result was
16. It turned out that the draft that we were shown was the only copy that the
government had and we had some difficulty returning it, for a colleague had inadver-
tently included it in papers that he took on holiday after Easter.
17. Loyalist paramilitaries had said on entering the Talks that they would decom-
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that Unionists were convinced that republicans were not genu-
inely committed to peace-a conclusion reinforced by the
knowledge that the "political" strategy being followed by republi-
cans was described by them in their internal documents as part
of "the tactical use of armed struggle."
A commitment to peaceful means was, of course, central to
the entire Agreement; without it any "peace process" would be a
mockery. Consequently, it appears prominently in the opening
section of the Agreement"' and is repeated in several subsequent
passages. Because of our lack of confidence in republican mo-
tives, we had insisted throughout the negotiations that holding
office in the new administration be clearly dependent on a com-
mitment to peaceful means and that that commitment be cross-
referenced to decommissioning.
Ultimately, the Agreement imposes the conditions that we
wanted on holding office: "Those who hold office should use
only democratic, non-violent means, and those who do not
should be excluded or removed from office under these provi-
sions.'" The cross-reference between Office and decommission-
ing is also included in the Agreement; because as it was coyly
placed in the decommissioning section rather than in Strand
One, many commentators have overlooked it.20
Our problem then was not with the requirement of a com-
mitment to peace and democracy or the linkage with decommis-
sioning as the litmus test, but with the procedures for exclusion
or removal in paragraph 25. These involved a vote in the Assem-
bly on a cross-community basis. In effect, that meant that no
matter what they did, Sinn F~in would only be removed if the
SDLP agreed. Many members of the Ulster Unionist Talks team
believed that this meant that the requirement to be committed
mission in parallel with republicans. The International Commission's Report (or
Mitchell Report) on decommissioning (January 1996) said that it was satisfied that all
paramilitaries were committed to decommissioning; but we do not know what assur-
ances were given to the Commission.
18. Belfast Agreement, supra note 1, Declaration for Support 4.
19. Id., Strand One, Democratic Institutions in Northern Ireland, Executive Au-
thority 25.
20. In paragraph I of the Decommissioning section, the participants reiterate that
the resolution of decommissioing is indispensable and "recall the provisions of para-
graph 25 of Strand 1." Id., Decommissioning 1. It should be remembered that the
Agreement is a political document, which in a number of cases adopts face-saving cir-
cumlocations where a legal document would have instead insisted on clarity.
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to peace and democracy would be a dead letter, just like the
original Mitchell Report on decommissioning and the resolu-
tions on decommissioning in the talks of September 1997.
Late on Friday afternoon, the principal members of the
Ulster Unionist Talks team-myself, John Taylor, Ken Maginnis,
Reg Empey, and Jeffrey Donaldson-went to see the Prime Min-
ister and urged him to strengthen the procedure in paragraph
25. We pointed out that it was a strand one matter concerning
the internal affairs of the United Kingdom and so a matter
within his power to change. He took the view that it could not
be changed without the agreement of others. I then drew atten-
tion to the transition period, which was then expected to be
about ten months or so, and indicated that the problem could
be solved during that period. The Prime Minister said that he
would reflect on the matter and see what comfort he could offer.
6. The Blair Letter
Shortly after the meeting, we received the following letter
from the Prime Minister. I ,
I understand your problem with paragraph 25 of Strand 1 is
that it 'equires decisions on those who should be excluded or
removed from office in the Northern Ireland Executive to be
taken on a cross-community basis.
This letter is to let you know that if, during the course of the
first six months of the shadow Assembly or the Assembly it-
self, these provisions have been shown to be ineffective, we
will support changes to these provisions to enable them to be
properly effective in preventing such people from holding of-
fice.
Furthermore, I confirm that in our view the effect of the
decommissioning section of the Agreement, with decommis-
sioning schemes coming into effect in June, is that the pro-
cess of decommissioning should start straight away.
Yours
Tony Blair
It was then on the basis of this letter, which was immediately
published, that we indicated our support for the Agreement.
Before doing so, I pointed out that I was accountable to the
party's executive and council for my actions. The executive met
the following day and endorsed the Agreement by a two-thirds
margin, and the following Saturday, April 18, seventy percent of
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the eight hundred strong Ulster Unionist Council also endorsed
the Agreement. On April. 10, Sinn Fain reserved their position.
During the referendum, however, they campaigned for the
Agreement.
7. Afterwards
The referendum on May 22, 1999 resulted in a "yes" vote of
71.2% in Northern Ireland. Opinion polls indicated that some
ninety-five percent of Catholics voted "yes," but that the "yes"
vote among Protestants was around fifty-five percent. All com-
mentators agreed that anger over prisoner release and doubts
about decommissioning were the main. reasons for Protestant
opposition to the Agreement. In the Assembly elections on June
25, 1998, thirty pro-Agreement unionists were elected (twenty-
eight Ulster Unionist and two PUP) and twenty-eight anti-Agree-
ment unionists (twenty DUP, five UKUP, and three independent
unionists). Since then one Ulster Unionist Assembly member
has defected to the anti-Agreement unionists.
The transitional period has thrown up many problems, most
of which have, at the time of writing, been resolved. I believe
that the remaining problems will also be resolved, even if we can-
not now predict precisely how and when that will happen. I also
believe, whatever happens to the Agreement or particular as-
pects of it, that on April 10, 1998, society in Northern Ireland
turned the corner and things can now only get better.
I see no reason to alter the words that I spoke on behalf of
the Ulster Unionist Party at the final plenary session of the talks
after the Agreement had been adopted by the participants under
the "sufficient consensus" rule.
Mr. Chairman, I know we rise from the table with the
Union stronger than when we first sat here. With one excep-
tion, the consent principle is accepted by nationalists, and
will soon, I trust, be enshrined in the fundamental law of the
Irish Republic.
We also rise with the prospect of democratic accountabil-
ity restored in a new Assembly in which the interests of all can
be protected, and having created a unique consultative and
co-operative structure, which will enable all the regions of the
British Isles to reflect in their interactions the many strands,
social, political, cultural and economic that exist.
We see this Agreement as addressing the wounds which
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have damaged our society, ensuring that our diverse tradi-
tions attract respect and, above all, laying the foundations for
a healthy, vibrant democracy to replace the stagnation, frus-
tration and powerlessness of the last three decades.
Whether it succeeds depends on our efforts in suc-
ceeding days. The opportunity is there. I believe the people
of Northern Ireland will make their choice and leave behind
those still mired in violence and hate.
Let us govern Northern Ireland together for the benefit
of all our citizens for it is we who know best the hearts and
minds of our own people and let us offer a vision of peace
and prosperity to our children.
